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1. Problems of other minds - introduction 
 
It is not necessary to articulate the problem of other minds in detail since it 
is one of the classical problems in philosophy of mind (for an overview, see 
Avramides 2001). The problem has three formulations: ontological, 
epistemological, and, the most recent one, conceptual. In a nutshell, the 
ontological problem of other minds concerns the existence of other minds: 
do other minds exist? Epistemological problem raises the question of the 
possibility of knowledge of other minds’ content: how can I know what 
others think or feel? The key question of the epistemological problem is 
whether mental states are private in nature and thus unobservable or, on 
the contrary, they can be perceived directly. According to the former, I can 
directly access only my mental states but not others’. The others’ mental 
states cannot be observed directly, therefore they must be cognized in 
some indirect way. The latter claim gives possibility to ground knowing 
other minds on perceptual basis. 
 Since René Descartes, several different solutions of the 
epistemological problem of other minds have been proposed, including 
such influential positions as inference from analogy (e.g. J.S. Mill, A.J. Ayer). 
Development of cognitive sciences in the last few decades and research in 
the field of social and developmental psychology renewed the debate (the 
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so called Theory of Mind debate) introducing a body of empirical research, 
which resulted in new positions. However, in this article I will not discuss 
all positions in the debate. There are simply too many of them to consider 
in this short paper. Moreover, recently in the debate there has been an 
attempt to reconcile indirect approaches (such as theory-theory or 
Simulation Theory) with the direct perception account and thus propose a 
hybrid theory (e.g. Fiebich & Coltheart 2015, Carruthers 2014, Stich & 
Nicols 2003). In general, hybrid theories acknowledge that we have more 
than one cognitive strategy of “mindreading”, for instance, perceptual and 
inferential, which we use depending on different factors. For example, the 
default strategy would be perceptual, and inference would be used second 
in case of insufficient perceptual information (Carruthers 2014). 
The third formulation of the problem of other minds is the 
conceptual problem, the origin of which can be found in Wittgenstein’s late 
philosophy (Wittgenstein 1968, Avramides 2001). This problem concerns 
the possibility of acquiring mental concepts, such as pain or sadness, that 
are universal, i.e., mental concepts which could be equally ascribed to 
myself and others. If we grasp the nature of pain on the basis of our “inner” 
experience, then how can we ascribe this concept of pain to others? To put 
it differently, how can mental concepts, which we understand on the basis 
of our experiences, be used both in the first as well as in the third person 
cases? A negative solution to the problem is to acknowledge that we have 
two different mental dictionaries, one first-personal and the other third-
personal. This idea is not only counterintuitive but also generates the 
problem of similarity criteria between concepts from different dictionaries. 
The challenge, then, is to develop a plausible positive account of mental 
concepts—one that accommodates the application of concepts in both the 
first and third person cases. 
  Not all proposals in the contemporary theory of mind debate 
address the conceptual problem. Thus, in the article I will focus only on 
these approaches which either consider the origin and nature of mental 
concepts explicitly, such as theory-theory (TT), or implicitly, like Direct 
Perception (DP), dispositional or phenomenological approach of Merleau-
Ponty.  
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2. Theory-theory and Direct Perception 
 
According to theory-theory (TT) we can know what others think or feel on 
the basis of inference (e.g. Baron-Cohen 1995, Carruthers 1996, Stich 
1983). We infer mental state of the other when we perceive his or her 
behavior by employing a theory (folk psychology) about other people's 
mental lives and behavior (Stich & Nicols 2003). Folk psychology can be 
understood here in two ways: (1) as a set of skills of mindreading, that is, 
skills of attributing mental states and predicting the others' behavior, or 
(2) as a collection of platitudes or a set of generalizations regarding the 
mental life of others and causal relations between mental states and 
external stimuli; e.g., if someone receives a painful stimulus, then he/she 
feels pain, which results in screaming, crying, etc. (behaving in a specific 
“painful” way). One can argue that it is impossible to give a list of all folk-
psychological platitudes. Although that is surely true, it is not necessary. 
Folk-psychology platitudes are rather putative, tacit, commonsensical 
knowledge, which is used implicitly in the process of mindreading. One can 
also raise the question: how do we acquire these platitudes? Some theory 
theorists (e.g. Carruthers 1996) claim that at least some of them are innate. 
Others argue that we gain them during development and through the 
acquisition of cultural practices.  
The direct perception (DP) account claims that at least in some 
situations we can directly perceive others’ mental states such as intentions 
and emotions (e.g. Cassam 2007, Gallagher 2008, Smith 2010a). The 
question of how perceptual knowledge of other minds is possible remains. 
Different versions of the DP account provide different answers. For 
example, Joel Smith (2010a) argues for a perceptual account using the 
Husserlian concept of perceptual co-presentation and a functionalist 
approach to mental properties. Seeing others’ mental states would be 
similar to perceiving three-dimensional objects: only the front side is 
sensually “present”, but the back side is perceptually “co-present”. Smith 
admits, however, that it is plausible that in different situations we have 
different strategies of gaining knowledge about others, including 
perceptual and inferential strategies. Quassim Cassam argues differently 
for the perceptual model. He claims “that one can sometimes know what 
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others are thinking or feeling by visual means” (2007, p. 170). This solution 
is supported by Dretske’s (1969) theory of epistemic perception which is 
non-inferential.  
 Now, how these approaches address the conceptual problem of 
other minds? According to theory-theory, mental concepts such as pain, 
sadness, or belief are theoretical terms, which at some point were 
introduced into our folk psychology. We use these theoretical entities to 
explain and predict behavior of others as well as our own. It may seem that 
TT omits the conceptual problem by postulating a common dictionary of 
mental terms and a common folk psychology. But how do we introduce and 
define these theoretical mental terms? Theory theorists usually refer here 
to functional definition. The idea of functional definition of theoretical 
mental terms was proposed by David Lewis (Lewis 1970, 1972; Stich 
1983). 
 
“Call these theoretical terms (T-terms for short) because they are introduced by a 
theory. Call the rest of the terms in the story O-terms. They are all the other terms 
except the T-terms; they are all the old, original terms we understood before the 
theory was proposed. We could call them pre-theoretical terms.” (Lewis 1972, p. 
88-89) 
 
To illustrate his idea, Lewis tells a detective story (1972). In the story, the 
detective investigates the death of Mr. Body. The detective observes the 
crime scene and notices various phenomena such as the victim’s body, 
blood on the wall, a broken window, etc. Then he proposes an explanation 
of the mystery, introducing the story of three individuals called X, Y, and Z 
who conspired to kill Mr. Body. The detective describes what role X, Y, and 
Z played in the conspiracy and the act of killing. When the detective is 
introducing his story, he does not know the real names and nature of X, Y, 
and Z, they are theoretical terms defined by their functional role. Their real 
names can be discovered in further investigation, if the theoretical 
hypothesis is true.  
 By analogy, mental concepts are theoretical terms introduced in 
order to explain human behavior. We use them to explain and predict 
others’ behavior as well as our own. Mental concepts as theoretical terms 
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are defined functionally, that is, by their functional role they play in the 
cognitive system. They are not observational terms, but observational 
terms (such as stimuli or bodily responses) can be used in their definitions. 
Lewis agrees that folk psychology was never introduced in a specific 
moment in the history of science, which makes it difficult to differentiate 
pre-theoretical terms from theoretical ones. Thus, he acknowledges that 
folk psychology is a myth, however, as he argues, it is a good myth because 
it gives us plausible explanation of social cognition. 
Besides the mythical origin of theory-theory, there are other 
problems with the functional definition of mental concepts, such as 
“narrow causal individuation” (Stich 1983, pp. 22-23). In short, causal 
individuation means that mental states are determined only by their causal 
interactions. theory-theory holds the narrow version of causal 
individuation, which means that causal links which determine mental 
states, are only those between mental states and other mental states, 
between mental states and stimuli, and between mental states and bodily 
responses or behavior. This means that functional definitions of mental 
terms are narrow and explanations produced by theory-theory cannot 
include links that go far beyond the organism, for example, past events or 
sociocultural facts. This obviously constrains explanatory power of TT, 
especially in highly contextual cases of human behavior.  
The next objection raised by Stich (1983) concerns causal links 
between mental states and behavior. Theory-theory claims that particular 
mental states, say, the experience of a headache, typically cause particular 
behavior, say, taking painkillers. However, this is only a statistical law 
dependent on one’s age, knowledge, social status, and, say, susceptibility to 
the pharmacological industry. Thus, “typically causes” is highly variable 
and dependent to various factors, which TT cannot address due to narrow 
constrains.  
Finally, it seems that TT omits the conceptual problem by 
postulating the same set of mental terms introduced in folk psychology and 
used to explain others’ as well as our own behavior. It is claimed that the 
grounds of self- and other-ascription are basically the same, namely, 
inference to the best explanation. It is not clear, however, if in both cases 
we deal with the same explanandum. In the case of other-ascription, data 
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are clearly behavioral, we explain what we actually see from a third person 
perspective, whereas in self-ascription cases, it is highly plausible that we 
deal with a sort of inner first-personal experience or introspective data. If 
so, then we use the same set of mental terms, defined using third-person 
terms (e.g. observational) to explain different phenomena, both first-
personal and third-personal. Another solution is that the grounds of self- 
and other-attribution do not have to be the same. For instance, according 
to Carruthers, it is plausible that other-attribution is based on “inference to 
the best explanation of (behavioral) data”, whereas “self-knowledge should 
be thought of analogous to the theory-laden perception of theoretical 
entities in science” (Carruthers 1996, p. 26). Accordingly, self-attribution is 
a kind of non-inferential (at least at a personal level) recognition of one’s 
mental state, which is characterized in mental (theoretical) terms. 
 
Now let’s consider how the Direct Perception account addresses 
these issues. DP states that we grasp others’ mental states on a perceptual 
basis, i.e., in direct observation of someone’s behavior. The cognitive 
process behind it is considered to be non-inferential but requiring a 
conceptual content for mental attribution. However, mental concepts are 
not theoretical terms, but they come from perception, and thus can be 
understood as either observational terms or ones that are reducible to 
them. In strong interpretation of DP, mental states are identical with 
behavioral states. This, however, generates the conceptual problem. How 
can we know that our mental concept of pain denotes identically the same 
behavioral state of the other? One way to answer this question is to reject 
introspection or any other kind of “inner” access and acknowledge that 
self- and other-ascriptions are grounded on the same basis, namely 
external observation (e.g. Cassam 2007). In some limited cases, it is 
plausible that we ascribe mental states by observing ourselves. But even if 
that is the case, the observational access from the first-person perspective 
and third-person perspective are radically different. According to Joel 
Smith (2010b), the direct perception account does not solve the conceptual 
problem of other minds. Moreover, it generates an analogous conceptual 
problem of other bodies, i.e., we end up with two separate sets of concepts 
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of behavioral/mental states, one from the first-person perspective the 
other from the third-person perspective. 
A weaker version of DP holds that relation between “inner” mental 
states and “outer” behavior is more complex. For example, Overgaard and 
Krueger propose a different reading of direct perception which redefines 
the relation between bodily expressions and mental states (Overgaard & 
Krueger 2012). They defend Direct Perception account referring to 
phenomenologists such as Max Scheler and Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
argue that bodily behavior is “constitutive” of mental states, which means 
that “certain bodily actions make up proper parts of some mental 
phenomena” (2012, p. 257). According to that, “we see others’ emotions by 
seeing proper parts of their emotions” (p. 255), which are embodied and 
observable. To use Overgaard’s and Krueger’s example, the tip of an 
iceberg is in this sense a proper part of iceberg and it might be said that 
seeing the tip of an iceberg on the horizon is to notice that there is an 
iceberg. It is not clear, however, what “constitutive” means here and how it 
is different from just “being a part of”. Tip of an iceberg is a visible part of 
the iceberg, similarly to the front side of a chair I see in front of me. If so, 
then maybe, following Smith (2010a), it is better to consider this relation 
in terms of co-presence and apperception instead of “constitution”. 
Furthermore, even if we agree that we can grasp mental states via “proper 
parts”, we do it either by external observation or by a sort of “inner” 
experience (e.g. proprioceptive experience of facial expressions, which are 
proper parts of an emotion). Thus, such interpretation of direct perception 
does not help to solve the conceptual problem. Still, the mental 
terminology is divided between the first-personal and the third-personal. 
In order to give plausible account of conceptual problem, this dichotomy 
has to be overcome. 
 
3. Dispositional and phenomenological account  
Choosing between theoretical and observational terms is not a satisfying 
solution for the conceptual problem of other minds. Both theory-theory 
and direct perception do not solve the problem but, moreover, they 
generate more problems. Is there a third option? There is at least one 
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interesting candidate, in favor of which I would like to argue. This account 
conceives mental concepts as dispositional terms. 
Dispositional account is usually linked with behaviorism, for 
example with Gilbert Ryle (1949/2009) and thus is a sister of direct 
perception. According to Ryle, mental concepts have dispositional nature 
i.e. they refer to subject’s dispositional properties. When we call someone 
intelligent or melancholic we express that he or she has tendency to 
behave in a particular way when specific conditions are realized. For 
example, we would call someone intelligent if he or she, when asked, 
answered questions concerning general knowledge. Importantly, 
dispositions concern not only what we actually observe but, first and 
foremost, what we would see when specific conditions were realized. 
Thanks to dispositional concepts we are able to foresee what will happen 
and explain what happened. Accordingly, mental concepts are dispositional 
terms which we use to predict and explain others’ behavior. 
Development of this approach was recently proposed by Eric 
Schwitzgebel (2013), who introduces dispositional account of attitudes. 
Schwitzgebel argues that: 
 
“to have an attitude is, (…) to have a dispositional profile that 
matches, to an appropriate degree and in appropriate respects, a 
stereotype for that attitude (…) To have an attitude (…) is mainly a 
matter of being apt to interact with the world in patterns that 
ordinary people would regard as characteristic of having that 
attitude.” (Schwitzgebel 2013, p. 75) 
 
To generalize this claim: to have an attitude, belief, or to have an emotion 
or feeling, such as pain, is to behave accordingly with a stereotype for that 
belief, emotion or feeling, or, as Schwitzgebel puts it, to “live a certain way” 
(2013, p. 76).  
 The key notion of this approach is stereotype. According to 
Schwitzgabel “a stereotype for a property X is a cluster of other properties 
that would be regarded as characteristic of something that possesses 
property X” (2013, p. 81). Not all properties are equally important for a 
stereotype, some are more, other are less. Thus, stereotype can be 
conceived as a space of properties from which some are more central, 
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other are peripheral. This approach specifies dispositional concepts as a 
piece of commonsensical knowledge which comes from folk psychology. 
For example, if someone believes that it is going to rain, he or she will wear 
a raincoat or take an umbrella. If someone has pain in his/her knee, he or 
she will limp, walk slowly, take painkillers etc. It seems, however, that 
dispositional terms cannot be reduced to observable data, because they 
concern all possible behavior matching the stereotype. Moreover, some 
behavior is highly contextual and depends on environmental and cultural 
conditions. This advantage lead at the same time to difficulties e.g. the 
acquiring problem (how do we know which properties constitute a 
stereotype?) and the selection problem (which properties form the 
stereotype cluster are central?). Simple answer states that we know all of 
this from folk psychology and present context. However, as I showed 
above, folk psychology has difficulties with narrow causal individuation, 
that is, in putting mental terms in socio-cultural context and long-time 
dependencies. Indeed, in some cases cultural background and personal 
history as well as bodily knowledge of skills can have strong influence on 
explaining behavior of others and ourselves. If so, then maybe it is worth  
trying to replace folk psychology with another approach. 
   
3.1 Phenomenological account 
Phenomenological account of other minds, especially the existential 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, is often read as a version of direct 
perception (Gallagher 2008, Overgaard & Krueger 2012). Here I would like 
to argue for a slightly different reading, namely that Merleau-Ponty’s 
explanation of intersubjective cognition is similar, to some extent, to the 
dispositional account.  
First of all, Merleau-Ponty argues that the ontological and 
epistemological problem of other minds are results of false dualistic 
ontology, which existential phenomenology is going to overcome. Mental 
states are not “inner” and private in the sense that they are not accessible 
for others. They are private only in the sense that we have first-personal 
access to them. Others, however, can have a third-personal access to my 
mental states and vice versa. This third-personal access, however, is not 
mediated by a theory. For Merleau-Ponty, understanding others’ mental 
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states is not a theoretical enterprise but a bodily practice. Thus Merleau-
Ponty, even if he claims something similar to the dispositional approach, he 
would oppose explaining cognition of others using theoretical terms of folk 
psychology. This does not mean, however, that social cognition does not 
have conceptual content. Mental concepts shape our understanding of 
others but have experiential basis. In Phenomenology of perception 
Merleau-Ponty writes: 
 
I perceive the other as a piece of behaviour, for example, I perceive the 
grief or the anger of the other in his conduct, in his face or his hands, 
without recourse to any ‘inner’ experience of suffering or anger, and 
because grief and anger are variations of belonging to the world, 
undivided between the body and consciousness, and equally 
applicable to the other’s conduct, visible in his phenomenal body, as in 
my own conduct as it is presented to me. (1945/2005, pp. 414-415) 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s solution to the epistemological problem goes like this: we 
do perceive mental states, such as anger or grief, in other’s behavior but 
they can be grasped only as instantiations of structures of existence or 
“belonging to the world”. These structures of existence are anonymous, yet 
experienced as living body, they are neither first-personal (self-
consciousness) nor third-personal (material body). To understand one’s 
intention, grief, or sadness is to apprehend a certain variation of existential 
structure, which we all share. These structure has many dimensions 
including: emotional attunement, intentional action, language. For 
Merleau-Ponty all of them are embodied and intertwined. A change in one 
dimension, say, a mood change, affects other aspects, say, temporality of 
action, or linguistic or gestural expressions. 
 Let’s consider an example. We see someone holding his or her knee 
and limping towards a bench. The perceived movement, facial gestures etc. 
express not only the intention and objective of action (to find a place to sit), 
but also its affective mode. The hurting knee shapes the subject’s 
sensorimotor pattern and thus reconfigures situatedness in the 
environment. We perceive someone’s limping movement as expression of 
pain and intention – looking for relief. However, what we apprehend is not 
isolated “inner” feeling of pain, but a holistic bodily disposition. On this 
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basis, we expect a certain set of behaviors and thus we can predict what 
observed person is up to. The situation is similar in the case of emotional 
states. When we see someone is afraid, say, of a spider on the wall, we 
grasp not only a particular object of fear, but the disposition to act in a 
specific way, say, to scream, move in the opposite direction, ask for help 
etc. 
An important difference between Merleau-Ponty and dispositional 
approach is that he emphasizes interactive, practical, and embodied nature 
of social cognition. As he writes in Phenomenology of Perception:  
 
No sooner has my gaze fallen upon a living body in process of acting 
than the objects surrounding it immediately take on a fresh layer of 
significance: they are no longer simply what I myself could make of 
them, they are what this other pattern of behaviour is about to make 
of them. [...] now, it is precisely my body which perceives the body of 
another, and discovers in that other body a miraculous prolongation 
of my own intentions, a familiar way of dealing with the world. 
(1945/2005, pp. 411-412) 
 
Merleau-Ponty argues that we not only understand what others do and 
could do in the environment, but also, and maybe most importantly, how 
we can interact as agents. The other is not a theoretical entity which I have 
to construct with theoretical terms but an embodied agent in whom I see a 
“familiar way of dealing with the world”.  
 Accordingly: i) I understand the other's behavior because I share 
the same existential structures (such as attitudes, emotions, sensorimotor 
capacities) which shape bodily experience; ii) understanding the other is 
based on the primal recognition that the other is also an embodied subject; 
iii) apprehension what the other feels, thinks, does etc., is an apprehension 
of his/her existential disposition or, to put it differently, an actual way of 
living; iv) apprehension of other’s disposition is immediately connected 
with my own dispositions, beliefs, and possible actions. I understand the 
other's behavior through myself and vice versa. I learn about myself thanks 
to others. 
 Now, having this background, how can we answer the conceptual 
problem? From Merleau-Ponty’s perspective, mental concepts are not 
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mental in the sense of being first-personal, inner and private, but they 
concern certain modes of existence, or, to put it differently, shared 
dispositions of being in the world. Being in fear, is neither a peculiar “inner 
feeling” given in first-personal experience, nor a belief “in the head”. Fear is 
a mode of emotional attunement with the world, and being in fear shifts 
different aspects of experience: it shapes bodily movements, gestures, 
thoughts, as well as practical engagement with surroundings. In short, 
being in fear changes our relation to the world on multiple levels.  
 Merleau-Ponty’s account can be read as an extension of 
dispositional account, however, disposition is understood here in a wide 
existential sense. It concerns our bodily and affective situatedness in the 
environment. Mental concepts would be dispositional terms understood as 
a multimodal (e.g. visual, motoric) representations of behavior. There is a 
threat, however, of misinterpreting such representations in internalist 
way. For example, according to Vittorio Gallese, we can read Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity in terms of embodied 
simulation (Gallese 2005). Gallese argues that we use neuronal 
representations of behavior in an internal simulation process, which 
results in mental ascription to others. There are, however, serious doubts 
whether this interpretation of phenomenological account is valid (Zahavi 
2012). Another reading, the so-called interaction theory, argues that social 
understanding is rooted in bodily practice of social interaction, which is 
understood as a dynamic and co-regulated process between autonomous 
embodied agents (e.g. Froese & Gallagher 2012). Accordingly, mental 
concepts would be minimal models of interaction which are deployed and 
specified in context of particular social interaction. 
 In sum, to be afraid, greedy, or hungry means to act, think, and feel 
accordingly with a specific behavioral profile (stereotype). Our 
understanding of such profile and applying relevant concept in everyday 
situations depends highly on the context, our previous experiences, as well 
as on sensorimotor capacities. This means that despite the fact that we 
share mental concepts as representations of social interaction and thus can 
understand each other, our experiences are not identical – to put it simply, 
your pain will never be my pain, although I understand what it is like to be 
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a subject of painful experience and I know possible profiles of behavior 
related with such experience. 
  
4. Conclusion 
The problem of other minds emerged from the Cartesian framework, 
where minds were considered as inner, isolated, and self-evident entities. 
The problem with mental concepts has the same origin. If we accept the 
view that mental states are “inner” and unobservable, like theory-theory, 
then we have to acknowledge that mental terms are theoretical constructs, 
although useful in explaining behavior. If we accept the possibility that we 
can, at least in some cases, see what others feel and think, then mental 
concepts have perceptual basis. Dispositional account, at least in the 
standard version above, argues for the dispositional nature of mental 
states, but it inherits some problems and constraints of theory-theory and 
folk psychology. Phenomenological reading of dispositional account argues 
for experiential and embodied basis of mental concepts used in social 
cognition, which primarily is social interaction. This approach not only 
gives justice to the complexity of social cognition and experience of others  
but also explains dispositions as situated in an environment and embodied.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
MENTAL CONCEPTS: THEORETICAL, OBSERVATIONAL OR 
DISPOSITIONAL APPROACH? 
In the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different 
approaches to mental concepts. Firstly, I introduce the conceptual problem 
and argue that solutions proposed by theory-theory and direct perception 
approach are inadequate. I claim that mental concepts are neither 
theoretical terms nor observational terms. Then, I consider third option 
which states that mental concepts are dispositional terms, i.e. they concern 
particular patterns (stereotypes) of behavior. Finally, I argue that 
dispositional approach is to some extent coherent with phenomenological 
account and that phenomenological concept of embodiment can improve 
this position.  
KEYWORDS: other minds; concepts; theory-theory; direct perception; 
dispositions; phenomenology 
 
